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EFFICIENT INJUSTICE:
THE DEMISE
OF THE "SUBSTANTIAL
INJUSTICE" EXCEPTION
TO ARBITRAL FINALITY
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase'

I. INTRODUCTION
Judicial review of an arbitrator's decision has been a point of much
controversy and discussion among jurisdictions. Many state legislatures have
enacted arbitration statutes that list the grounds for review of an arbitrator's
decision. However, over time, the courts have also developed some common law
grounds for judicial review. Conflict often arose when a state's statute did not
provide for review on the same grounds as common law. This Note examines
how the California Supreme Court dealt with the difference in the statutory and
common law grounds for judicial review of an arbitrator's decision.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Appellant, Philip Moncharsh, an attorney, was hired by the law firm of
Heily & Blase (H & B), appellee, on June 16, 1986.2 Moncharsh signed an
agreement containing provisions governing his employment.' One provision
(paragraph X-C) provided that if Moncharsh terminated his employment and took
any of H & B's clients with him, Moncharsh would give H & B 80 percent of the
fees generated by those clients.'

1. 832 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1992) (en banc).
2. Id.at 900.
3. Id.

4. Id. at 900-01. The provision regarding fees stated:
In the event that any FIRM client should terminate the attorney-client relationship with
FIRM and substitute EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY or another attorney or law firm who[m]
EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY suggested, recommended or directed as client's successor
attorney, then, in addition to any costs which client owes FIRM up to the time of such
substitution, as to all fees which EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY may actually receive from
that client or that client's successor attorney on any such cases, BLASE will receive
eighty percent (80%) of said fee and EMPLOYEE-ATTORNEY will receive twenty
percent (20%) of said fee.
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On February 29, 1988, Moncharsh quit working for H & B.' DeWitt
Blase, senior partner at H & B, contacted nearly 30 of Moncharsh's clients and
told them that they had signed a retainer agreement with the firm and that he; and
not Moncharsh, would be handling their cases from that point forward.' Five
clients whom Moncharsh had represented before commencing employment at H
& B and a sixth client, who had retained Moncharsh less than two weeks prior
to his quitting the firm, decided to continue their representation through
Moncharsh. 7
Upon learning Moncharsh had received fees generated by the six clients,
Blase instituted an action to recover a share of the fees in quantum meruit as well
as a percentage of the fees pursuant to the employment agreement.' Moncharsh
extended an offer to settle only the quantum meruit share of the fees, which Blase
rejected. 9 The parties then submitted the case to an arbitrator pursuant to the
arbitration clause of the employment contract.1°
In his brief submitted to the arbitrator, Moncharsh contended that: (1) H &
B was entitled only to the quantum meruit share of fees;' (2) an oral agreement
between Moncharsh and Blase provided that clients Moncharsh brought with him
would be treated differently; 2 (3) the employment agreement was unenforceable
because it had been terminated; 3 (4) the employment agreement was adhesionary
and unenforceable;' 4 and (5) provision X-C violated "public policy, the Rules
and is inconsistent with Fracasse
of Professional Conduct of the State Bar ....
v. Brent and Champion v. Superior Court.""

Id. at 901.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. The arbitration clause provided that:
Any dispute arising out of this Agreement shall be subject to arbitration under the rules
of the American Arbitration Association. No arbitrator shall have any power to alter,
amend, modify or change any of the terms of this agreement. The decision of the
arbitrator shall be final and binding on firm and employee-attorney.
Id. n.1.
11. Id.at 901.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. In Fracasse v. Brent, 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972), the court held that an attorney who is
terminated, with or without cause, is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his or her services.
Id. at 14. In Champion v. Superior Court, 247 Cal. Rptr. 624 (Ct. App. 1988), the court held that
an employment contract clause providing that all fees and clients were to remain the property of the
firm was an agreement to collect an unconscionable fee and violated the Rules of Professional
Conduct. Id. at 626. In addition, the agreement reviewed by the Champion court denied clients their
choice of counsel. Id. at 627. The court also held that the firm could recover in quantum meruit for
the value of the firm's contribution to the case. Id. at 628.
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H & B, in its brief to the arbitrator, contended that provision X-C (1) was
clear and unequivocal, 6 (2) was not unconscionable, 7 and (3) represented a
reasonable attempt to avoid litigation and was thus akin to a liquidated damages
provision. 1" H & B also alleged that Moncharsh had solicited the six clients to
remain with him because, in part, financial settlements of those six clients' cases
were near. 19 In contrast, H & B alleged that Moncharsh failed to pursue the
clients whose cases required substantial legal work.2'
The arbitrator ruled in favor of H & B, stating that the oral agreement was
never documented, and, therefore, the written agreement controlled. 2' The
arbitrator further ruled that, because Moncharsh was a "mature, experienced
attorney" when he signed the employment contract and could have refused or
negotiated a different contract, provision X-C was not unconscionable with respect
The arbitrator did hold that provision X-C was
to the first five clients.'
unconscionable with respect to the sixth client because that client was obtained so
close to the termination of Moncharsh's employment.23
Subsequently, Moncharsh petitioned the superior court to vacate and to
modify the award, and H & B petitioned to have the court confirm the award. 24
The superior court ruled that "the arbitrator's finding on questions of both law
and fact are conclusive. A court cannot set aside an arbitrator's error of law no
matter how egregious. "' The court did note an exception to this general rule
where the error appears on the face of the award. 26 The court, however, did not
find any such error and ruled in favor of H & B. 27
On appeal, the court of appeals noted the same general rule and
exception.28 The court added to the exception the requirement of a result of
substantial injustice. 29 According to the appellate court, a court can review an
arbitrator's decision only if there is error on the face of the decision and that

16. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 901.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.at 901-02.
23. Id.at 902.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. Error on the face of the award is error that is objected to during the arbitration and then
embodied in the report of the referee or made part of the report by being properly certified- to the
referee. Id.at 907 (citing Tyson v. Wells, 2 Cal. 122, 131 (1852)).
27. Id.at 902.
28. Id.
29. Id. Substantial injustice in the context of judicial review of an arbitrator's decision occurs
when an arbitrator's decision affects the substantial rights of a party on the merits of the case. Utah
Constr. Co. v. Western Pac. R.R., 162 P. 631, 634 (Cal. 1917).
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error results in substantial injustice." ° The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's holding. 3
On writ of certiorari, the California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court
and held: (1) an arbitrator's award, reached pursuant to a contractual agreement
to arbitrate, is not subject to judicial review, except where authorized by
statute;32 and (2) an error of law appearing on the face of an arbitration award
which causes substantial injustice does not provide grounds for judicial review.33
III. LEGAL HISTORY
In California, the issue of arbitral finality arose prior to the existence of any
statutes governing arbitration.'
In 1852, the California Supreme Court, in
Muidrow v. Norris,35 examined its ability to review an arbitrator's award. 6
The Muldrow court created an exception to arbitral finality and allowed review
of an arbitrator's award under certain circumstances. 37
The Muidrow court recognized that a court of equity could set aside awards
for fraud, mistake, or accident, whether the issue involved fact or law.3" The
court also recognized that arbitrators are not constrained to award on the basis of
law and can decide the matter before them based on equity and good
conscience.3 9 However, if an arbitrator purports to decide according to the law
and mistakes the law, the Muidrow court held that courts can set the award
aside.' When an arbitrator makes the point a "matter of judicial inquiry by
spreading it upon the record, and [he or she] mistake[s] the law in a palpable and
material point," a court may set aside the arbitrator's award. 4 Arbitrators who
explain their award are assumed to decide according to the law, and, therefore,
judicial review is permitted.42 The award could be set aside because the
arbitrator intended to decide according to the law, and if he or she mistook the
law, the award would not be what they actually intended.43

30.
31.
32.
33.

Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 902.
Id.
Id. at 919.
Id.

34. Id. at 906.

35. 2 Cal. 74 (1852).
36. See id. at 77.
37. Id. at 77-78. The Muldrow court allowed judicial review if an arbitrator purported to decide
according to the law and then mistook the law. Id.; see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
38. Muldrow, 2 Cal. at 77.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 77-78.
41. Id. at 78.
42. Id.
43. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1993/iss1/10

4

19931

Smith: Smith: Efficient Injustice: The Demise of teh Substantial Injustice
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION

Less than a month later, in Tyson v. Wells," the California Supreme Court
recognized that an arbitrator's award may be set aside if the error complained of
appears on the face of the award.45 The Tyson court cited Muldrow as authority

but did not include the requirement that the mistake be on a palpable and material
point. 46
The requirements for judicial review in California changed again six months
later in Headley v. Reed.' The Headley court held that to set aside an award
48
there must be "fraud or gross error of law or fact apparent upon its face."
Thus the Headley court, while purporting to rely on Muldrow, further changed
the test by requiring gross error on the part of the arbitrator.49
Concurrently to the Muldrow, Tyson, and Headley cases, the California
0
legislature enacted the Civil Practice Act of 1851.1 That act specified the
5
The act did
grounds upon which a court could vacate an arbitrator's award.

not provide for vacation of an arbitrator's award due to gross error on the face
of the award.52

In 1854, the California Supreme Court heard Peachy v. Ritchie,53 the first

case to interpret this act. The Peachy court held the act to be no more than a

reaffirmation of the common law.' 4 The court went on to hold that an award

5
could not be set aside except in the circumstances set out in Muldrow
56
Five years later, in Carsley v. Lindsay, the California Supreme Court
began to shift toward the view that the grounds outlined in the statute were
required to set aside the award of an arbitrator.57 The Carsley court did not

44. 2 Cal. 122 (1852).
45. Id. at 131.
46. See id. at 131-33.
47. 2 Cal. 322 (1852).
48. Id. at 325.
49. Id.; see Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 907.
50. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 907; 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. CXXHI.
51. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 907. The act allowed vacation of an award on the following
grounds: (1) that the award "'was procured by corruption or fraud,'" id. (quoting 1851 Cal. Stat. ch.
CXXIII, § 386); (2) that "'the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct or committed gross error in
refusing, on cause shown, to postpone the hearing, or in refusing to hear pertinent evidence, or
otherwise acted improperly, in a manner by which the rights of the party were prejudiced,'" id. at
907-08 (quoting 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. CXXIII, § 386); (3) that "'the arbitrators exceeded their powers
in making their award; or that they refused, or improperly omitted, to consider a part of the matters
submitted to them; or that the award is indefinite, or cannot be performed,'" id. at 908 (quoting 1851
Cal. Stat. ch. CXXIII, § 386).
52. Id.
53. 4 Cal. 205 (1854).
54. Id. at 207.
55. Id.
56. 14 Cal. 390 (1859).
57. See id. at 394.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1993

5

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1993, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 10
[Vol. 1993, No. I
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
recognize at common law, nor by statute, error of law as a ground for vacating
an arbitrator's award.'
The trend toward strict statutory construction continued in 1872, when the
Civil Practice Act was codified as section 1287 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure.59 In 1900, this statute was addressed by the California Supreme
Court in In re Connor.' The Connor court held that the only grounds for
vacating an arbitrator's award were those stated in section 1287.61 However, the
court went on to state that gross error was also a ground for vacating an award,
although it was not included in section 1287.62 Subsequently, the California
Supreme Court seemed to withdraw from its strict interpretation stance. In 1917,
the court, in Utah Construction Co. v. Western Pacific Railway,63 allowed for
vacation of an award if an error of law appeared on the face of the award and
caused substantial injustice.'
In 1927, the California legislature recodified and renumbered section 1287
as section 1288.' The changes in the new statute were that an award could be
vacated "when the award was procured by undue means and . . . [when the
arbitrators] so improperly executed [their powers] that a mutual, final and definite
award ...was not made."'
In 1946, the California Supreme Court addressed judicial review under
section 1288 in Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd.67 The Pacific
Vegetable Oil court twice stated the grounds for vacation, both times reciting the
grounds listed in section 1288.6 Neither time did the court mention error on the
face of the award as causing substantial injustice as grounds for vacating the
award.' The California Supreme Court addressed the statute again in Crofoot
v. Blair Holdings Corp.7' The Crofoot court concluded that the 1927 statute was
intended to be the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award and that
all common law doctrines were abolished. 7 The court further held that, without
an express provision in the arbitration agreement, questions of fact or law would
not be reviewed except as provided for in the statute.'

58. See id.
59. Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 909; see
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1287 (West 1872).
60 P. 862 (Cal. 1900).
Id.at 862.
Id.at 863.
162 P. 631.
Id.at 633.
See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 911.
Id.(citing 1927 Cal. Stat. ch. 225, § 9).
174 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1946).
See id.at 445, 448.

69. See generally id.
70. 260 P.2d 156 (Cal. 1953).
71. Id.at 169.
72. Id.at 172.
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Section 1288 was subsequently slightly altered and renumbered section

1286.2 in 1927. 73 Currently, a majority of California jurisdictions have adopted
the rule that judicial review is available on the grounds provided for in the
statute.74 This rule is also followed in a majority of states.75 However, some

recent California decisions have revived the rule that a court may review an
award if it contains error on its face resulting in substantial injustice. 76
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

A. The Majority
On appeal to the California Supreme Court, Moncharsh alleged that the court
may review an arbitrator's decision if there is error of law on the face of the

73. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 914. Section 1286.2 provides that the court may vacate an
arbitrator's award if:
a) [t]he award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; b) [tihere was
corruption in any of the arbitrators; c) [tihe rights of such party were substantially
prejudiced by the misconduct of a neutral arbitrator; d) [t]he arbitrators exceeded their
powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision
upon the controversy submitted; or e) [t]he rights of such party were substantially
prejudiced by the refusal of the arbitrators to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor or by the refusal of the arbitrators to hear evidence material to the
controversy or by other conduct of the arbitrators contrary to the provisions of this title.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1286.2 (West 1992).
74. See Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 914.
75. Id.; see, e.g., Verdex Steel & Constr. Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 509 P.2d 240, 244
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1973); Affiliated Mktg. v. Dyco Chem. & Coatings, 340 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 353 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1977); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. Makahuena
Inc., 675 P.2d 760, 765 (Haw. 1983); Bingham County Comm'n v. Interstate Elec. Co., 665 P.2d
1046, 1052 (Idaho 1983); Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333, 1337 (I11.
App. Ct. 1982); State v. Sightes, 416 N.E.2d 445, 450 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); City of Sulphur v.
Southern Builders, Inc., 579 So. 2d 1207, 1210 (La. Ct. App. 1991), cert. denied, 587 So. 2d 699
(La. 1991); Plymouth-Carver Sch. Dist. v. J. Farmer & Co., 553 N.E.2d 1284, 1285 (Mass. 1990);
AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 299 (Minn. 1984);
Savage Educ. Ass'n v. Richland County Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 7, 692 P.2d 1237, 1240 (Mont.
1984); New Shy Clown Casino, Inc. v. Baldwin, 737 P.2d 524, 524 (Nev. 1987); Kearny PBA No.
21 v. Town of Kearny, 405 A.2d 393, 399 (N.J. 1979); Cyclone Roofing Co. v. LaFave Co., 321
S.E.2d 872, 879 (N.C. 1984); Aamot v. Eneboe, 352 N.W.2d 647, 649 (S.D. 1984); Utility Trailer
Sales of Salt Lake, Inc. v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987); Milwaukee Police Ass'n v. City
of Milwaukee, 285 N.W.2d 133, 136-37 (Wis. 1979). But see Texas West Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1056, 1060-61 (Wyo. 1986) (statutory grounds to vacate an arbitration award
held not to be exclusive).
76. See, e.g., Moncharsh, 832 P.2d at 915 (citing Schneider v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 264 Cal.
Rptr. 227, 230 (Ct. App. 1989); Park Plaza, Ltd. v. Pietz, 239 Cal. Rptr. 51, 54 (Ct. App. 1987);
Ray Wilson Co. v. Anaheim Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 213 Cal. Rptr. 62, 68 (Ct. App. 1985); Hirsch
v. Ensign, 176 Cal. Rptr. 17, 21 (Ct. App. 1981); Abbott v. California State Auto. Ass'n, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 580, 584 (Ct. App. 1977); Campbell v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 67 Cal. Rptr. 175, 179 (Ct. App.
1968)).
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award that results in substantial injustice, the arbitrator exceeds his or her power,
or the decision is illegal or violative of public policy.'
In Moncharsh's case, the court found that his petition did not satisfy any of
the statutory grounds for judicial review and therefore affirmed the trial court's
ruling that the decision was not reviewable.78 In addition, the California
Supreme Court overruled the appellate court and held that error of law on the
face of the award resulting in substantial injustice does not provide grounds for
judicial review.79 The court concluded that Moncharsh had not shown why the
presumption in favor of arbitral finality should not apply, and, therefore, the
award was not reviewable. 8°
The court also concluded that the arbitrator did not exceed his power." An
arbitrator does not exceed his or her power, according to the Moncharsh court,
if he or she decides an issue for an erroneous reason. 2 The court reasoned that
a contrary decision would circumvent the rule against judicial review by allowing
parties to obtain review by alleging that the arbitrator erred and exceeded his or
her power. 3
In addition, the court noted that the California statute allows the arbitrator
to decide all of the merits of a controversy submitted to arbitration.'
Moncharsh did not contend that the arbitrator decided an issue that was beyond
the scope of the arbitration agreement; aO the arbitrator decided an issue that
arose out of the employment contract.' .Moncharsh and H & B's arbitration
agreement was intended to encompass all disputes arising out of the employment
contract.'8
Therefore, the court held that the arbitrator did not exceed his
power. 8
The court also rejected Moncharsh's contention that the fee-splitting
provision was illegal and therefore not subject to arbitration.89 The court held
that the arbitration clause allowed the arbitrator to determine the legality of the
fee-splitting provision.' However, the court did state that judicial review would
be available if a party alleged that the entire contract or the arbitration clause was
illegal.91

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 905-06.
Id. at 916.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 917.
Id.
Id.at 917-18.
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The court recognized that there may be certain exceptional circumstances
where a party may obtain judicial review of portions of a contract on the grounds
For instance, the court stated that one exception would lie in
of illegality.'
granting finality to the arbitrator's decision that is inconsistent with a party's
statutory rights." However, the court further stated that absent an expression
of public policy by the legislature, courts should hesitate to review an award on
this ground.' The court reasoned that the legislature had already expressed its
support for the arbitration statute and arbitral finality and that, without clear
illegality or a statement of public policy "undermining this strong presumption in
favor of private arbitration, an arbitral award should ordinarily stand immune
from judicial scrutiny."95
Finally, the court rejected the argument that provision X-C violated public
policy.' The court quickly disposed of Moncharsh's argument by stating that
this was merely an ordinary fee-splitting dispute which did not involve any issues
of professional conduct and therefore did not violate public policyY
B. The Dissent
9
Justice Kennard, in his dissent, agreed with the majority's result " but not
with the holding that error on the face of an award resulting in substantial
injustice was not grounds for review. 99 He reasoned that the judiciary's role in
society is to achieve justice."' ° Justice Kennard agreed with the decisions
allowing review of gross error or errors resulting in substantial injustice;' ' he
stated that the judiciary's main role in society should be to promote justice, and
he argued that courts should strive to correct any injustice presented to them."2
To ignore an injustice and to refuse to correct it solely because it does not fall
within the prohibitions of a statute, according to Justice Kennard, does not
achieve this goal.)

92. Id. at 919.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id. at 924 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
99. Id. at 919-20.

100. Id. at 920.
101. Id. at 920-22.
102. Id. at 920-21.
103. Id. at 922-23.
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V. COMMENT
Judge Kennard makes a convincing argument in his dissent for allowing
judicial review of arbitration: The main goal of the judiciary is justice."
From the inception of the American legal system, judicial review has offered
relief from "capricious decisions, prejudicial error, inequity, and inequality."" °
However, arbitration decisions are usually final or permit review only under such
limited circumstances such as "fraud, bribery, serious misconduct, or total lack
of jurisdiction. " "
While alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is supposed to allow a quicker,
less expensive, and more efficient solution to litigation, it does not seem fair to
the parties involved not to allow judicial review based on gross error or manifest
injustice. Parties rely on arbitration as an alternative to litigation; their main
objective in arbitration is a fair decision through a more efficient process. If
parties knew ahead of time that an arbitrator may make a blatant error and that
the error may be allowed to stand, they may not choose to arbitrate. Even though
the decisionmakers in ADR proceedings may take into consideration factors other
than the law, such as equity, the parties should not be bound by decisions
imposing unfair damages, penalties, or awards.
In society, parties conform their conduct to what they perceive the law to be.
Contracts are entered into, corporations are managed, and investments are made
all under the assumption that such actions will be governed by the law. By
allowing decisions that are obviously contradictory to the law to stand, without
judicial review, courts may be penalizing parties who, in good faith, conformed
their actions to the law. Even though arbitrators may be able to weigh other
factors, they should not be allowed to decide issues contrary to established statutes
and legal doctrines.
If the courts will not allow review of arbitral decisions without express
statutory authorization, the legislatures in these jurisdictions should examine their
statutes closely. Statutes which do not allow for some type of review of gross
errors resulting in manifest injustice should have this common law exception
codified as a statute. In this manner, the courts will be given the authorization
they require in order to review an arbitrator's award under these circumstances.
Statutes providing for review under these circumstances will allow courts to
prevent injustice and make decisions that parties would expect.'
If the "gross-error-resulting-in-manifest-injustice" exception to arbitral
finality is eliminated, then arbitral decisions containing errors of this nature, but

104. Id. at 920.
105. James L. Guill & Edward A. Slavin, Jr., Rush to Unfairness: The Downside of ADR, 28
JUDGES J., Summer 1989, at 8, 12.
106. Id. (citing Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988)).
107. See Lieberman v. Lieberman, 566 N.Y.S.2d 490, 495 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (not limiting judicial
review to statutory grounds); Texas W. Oil, 726 P.2d at 1061-62 (same). But see Traveler's Ins. Co.
v. Valcort, 506 N.Y.S.2d 213, 214 (App. Div. 1986).
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no other statutory exception to finality, will be allowed to stand. If this occurs,
the reliability of ADR will fall under scrutiny. If parties cannot rely on ADR to
bring about decisions they feel are fair or just, they may choose not to resort to
ADR at all and will litigate instead.
Without review of gross errors resulting in manifest injustice, ADR may not
be as efficient nor as helpful as originally proposed. If a party becomes the
victim of such error, the result may be more costly than the rejected chose of
litigation. It is easy to imagine multi-million-dollar contract arbitrations going
awry under these circumstances and costing the "loser" much more than if he or
she would have litigated and received a decision made without gross error."°
It is also not hard to imagine an arbitrator making these errors in complex and
highly technical areas of the law."0
VI. CONCLUSION
Statutes, courts, and ADR should interact and work together to provide fair
and equitable solutions to disputes. Parties that do not feel confident that ADR
will bring about equitable decisions will probably turn more and more toward the
courts to resolve their disputes because litigation provides more predictability.
Although not every error made by an arbitrator should be subject to judicial
review, those errors that result in manifest injustice should be reviewed by the
court, either under the common law or by statutory authorization. In short, ADR
should provide efficient justice, not efficient injustice.
MICHAEL J. SMITH

108. Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J., 425, 430 (1988).
109. Id.
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